War in Ukraine

I would respectfully disagree that another 12 months would make a significant difference on the current battlefield that would allow the AFU to have a shot at retaking Crimea. I just do not see enough evidence of significant domestic turmoil in Russia to predict a major meltdown large enough that the C2 of Russian forces dissolve to the point Russian forces in the area collapse. Especially after the Chef took his best shot at the Czar and missed. Even if that were to happen, Crimea would be the natural fall back position for the RGF along the southern front.

 

That is one possible outcome, I agree. But my point remains that Russian political/economic stability is the key variable here, and that situation grows progressively worse for Russia. There is simply no telling what could happen in another year. Syria is not Russia, of course, but it is the most current example we have of political collapse. One year ago, absolutely no one the Assad Regime was in any danger.

 

I watched a good portion of that video, starting at the 21:00 mark, and I did not get the impression the SECDEF thinks our Navy is 10 years behind Russia (or China). He did say we need to rebuild our defense industrial base, and I find that hard to argue against in the context of Russia's invasion of Ukraine and the amount of munitions that war is consuming.

 

It wasn't about fire support to retake Crimea, it was about cutting off the land bridge and putting the Kerch bridge in range of HIMARS munitions the Ukrainians had at the time, the GLSDB, and cutting off the peninsula from supplies. Interdiction, not invasion.

That could have been done if the Ukrainian 2023 offensive (which waited 6 months (Jan.-Jul.) to gear up due to allied foot dragging) had gotten off before Russians reorganized and built three defensive lines in depth across front lines of the land bridge to Crimea.

Had the offensive been an actual surprise and started earlier and pushed along the Zaporizhzhia axis to the Black Sea (about 100km to the coast) severing the land bridge, it would have pushed into fire range of the GLSDB (150km), which Ukraine had by early 2024. It would have put the bridge under threat which might have caused an exodus of Russian civilians trying to flee and disrupted supplies into Crimea until they were ready to attack the bridge (better to let the rats off the ship than fight them).

Nevertheless, they now have ATACMs which could hit the Kerch bridge today from Zaporizhzhia (300km) if we've supplied the M57 version with improved penetration over the M48 version. Guess it isn't on our list of allowed targets or something. The British tried with Storm Shadows, wonder what could have been with both attacking in concert with naval drones.

 

Embarrassing. John Paul Jones is rolling over in his grave. The Russian Navy is barely functional at most levels. Hegseth is an idiot.

Finland could mobilize its 700,000 man army and be in Moscow in a week without NATO involvement at this point, no need for a naval confrontation at all.

 

And after he walked it back, Trump slapped him down. Meanwhile Germany basically called Trump an idiot for giving things away before negotiations even start, and both they and Z basically questioned why negotiations were happening without them. Even Russia had to point out that Ukraine will be part of the negotiations.
Or, essentially what I said yesterday. It was a poorly communicated, wrong message from the wrong people. It I’m sure it will be defended still.

 

Russia does have a lot more experience towing its one aircraft carrier from one ocean to the next. The U.S. has very little experience in towing any of its 11 aircraft carriers. So for aircraft carrier towing vessels, I'm going to have to say that Russia is in the lead.

 

It's almost like Trump hired a Fox News reporter to be Secretary of Defense.

 

Yup. Dude likes to hear himself talk. What could go wrong?

 

OK, there are two ways forward here:

1. You agree to just drop the idea that this COA was realistic and feasible and we just move on observing recent developments in this conflict.

2. I walk you through a series of questions that you will have to answer that will show your assumptions are not accurate and prove that this COA you have been championing was not feasible or realistic in '23 or now in '24 and the people you think are responsible actually are not.

Here is an appetizer of what I mean, why are you suggest the use of GLSDB on the Kerch considering their effectiveness and range limitations?

 

Because it was the longest range HIMARS munition the Ukrainians would have had in that timeframe before ATACMS and would have been in range (150 km) to put the bridges under threat from the coast of the Sea of Azov, even with its payload limitations and later, guidance issues with Russian countermeasures.

Google Earth

As far as the original plan of attack for the 2023 counteroffensive along the Zaporizhzhia - Melitopol axis to the Sea of Azov:

Mapping Ukraine’s counteroffensive

 

1. When were GLSDB's introduced to Ukraine?
2. What is the max range of a GLSDB?
3. What has been the determination on the effectiveness of the GLSDB?
4. What platform is the GLSDB fired from?
5. Where would the GLSDB have to be fired from to be able to range the Kerch bridge?
6. What would be the desired effect of targeting the Kerch bridge?

 

1. Early Feb. 2024, which would be feasible after a successful offensive to cut the Russia supply lines to Crimea mentioned in last post in early 2023 and completing by Jan. 2024 had we not delayed the offensive when Russia was off balance from previous Ukrainian offensives and defensive positions had not been prepared. The opened corridor would only have been threatened from eastern side as any significant movements from the western lines facing Ukrainian forces would have drawn in Ukrainian units who were facing them and resupply in any case would have been cut off.
2. 150-160 km depending on sources.
3. After introduction, they were quickly degraded by Russian jamming of their GPS guidance, but would have been effective for a short time frame, possibly enough to cripple the bridge.
4. HIMARS can fire the GLSDB which is attached to a Mk. 26 rocket motor, but it can also be airdropped as the GBU-39 which Ukraine has used to 90% effectiveness in combat.
5. Google map in previous post.
6. To put the bridge under threat of degradation or destruction along with other platforms (multi-axis coordinated attacks with naval drones and cruise missiles) to finish cutting off logistical access by land to Crimea to starve it out.

 

Russia will accept nothing less than Ukraine's unconditional surrender. Whether Ukraine becomes a member of NATO is not up for discussion. That will never happen, period.

Ukraine will be forced to give up a huge amount of territory and many trillions of dollars worth of natural resources. Too bad most people posting on this thread weren't smart enough to see this is what would happen from day 1.

As for "degrading Russia," it's GDP grew by 4.1% in 2024. Congratulations General chemgator. People are now saying that the richest people in Europe are now the Ukrainians.

 

1. So are you suggesting that the GLSDB could have ranged the Kerch bridge if the AFU had been able to conduct a successful counter offensive?
2. Correct.
3. Incorrect. GLSDB were quickly determined to be ineffective for much '24 by the AFU according to open source reporting.
4. Are you suggesting a GLSDB with a M26 rocket attached can be air dropped or just the warhead?
5. For a GLSDB to be able to range the Kerch bridge, it would have to located within Crimea peninsula given a range limitation of 150km. It would actually have to be to the east of Dzhankoi Air Base in NE Crimea. There are no spots that would be a practical PAA for a launcher to be able to range the Kerch along the Ukrainian western coast of the Sea of Azov.
6. So you are trying to drop a span of the bridge or just putting craters into the bridge? We are in agreement that you are not actually trying to hit any logistical convoys moving over the bridge, yes?

 

1. Yes, because if the land corridor to Crimea was cut off, but the bridge wasn't, the offensive doesn't make sense.
3. They were effective early, but jamming took them out quickly, but that wasn't know before they arrived and the offensive to cut off land access to Crimea was planned before that.
4. No, the GBU-39 is attached to the M26 for the GLSDB, the GBU-39 alone is air-dropped.
5. No, it could be fired from the northern coast of the Sea of Azov, after the counteroffensive, over the Sea of Azov from the northwest. Range is 150 km in the Google map link I attached on my last post.
6. Crater the roadway with the GLSDB, and hopefully in concert with other weapons, keep the bridge from functioning to facilitate Russian logistics, otherwise the offensive above to cut the land corridor is wasted. Dropping a span might have been a bridge too far with the warheads in question. More probable with an M57 ATACMS.

 

1. So you are saying that the AFU counter offensive would have been able to create a corridor all the way to the Sea of Azov from Zaporizhzhia? Do you actually think that would have been military feasible, realizing that this would require over a 100KM advance by AFU forces in the area and require them to able to hold it against attacks from both the East and the West along a 100KM axis?
4. No, the GLSDB was not effective early. I'm not sure where you are getting that. (GLSDB munitions proven largely ineffective in Ukraine — Pentagon). Let me know if you want the video of Dr. LaPlante discussing the issues with the GLSDB.
5. Wrong. You need to go back and actually do the distance measuring. The only areas along the western coast of the Sea of Azov that you suggest that are within 150 km is near Kyrylivka, which is on a confined peninsula and that area is much too small for a PAA for a GLSDB launcher to fire from. Even if you did, you would only be able to fire from it once or twice before the Russians had it under constant ISR surveillance and prepared for counter fire.
6. So how many hits with a 250lb bomb would create enough craters to actually impact the viability of the bridge that could not be quickly repaired?

 

We get it. You love Russia