Hard to say. We only see a fraction of the dialogue here. The SECDEF might have been speaking out of turn as you suggest, but he might have been conveying an authorized military message that falls totally within his purview: that it is not realistic militarily for Ukraine to retake Crimea. Now that could change very easily in six months, and I hope it does. For the moment, though, Crimea might be the price of a possibility of getting both sides to the table to negotiate a settlement that both sides can live with.
Let's remember that NATO membership and a security guarantee are two different things. The first is the second, but the second is not necessarily the first. I also don't think NATO membership is a realistic outcome of any negotiations that would happen in the next 100 days. Russia would have to bleed quite a bit more for that outcome, and negotiations -- this round anyway -- would have to fail first. But we will see.
First, the SecDef is not speaking on FP like this without approval from POTUS, especially knowing that he is headed to Europe to speak about this exact thing. Seeing this is a shooting war and the US is donating a lot of equipment and munitions, this is more in the lane of the SecDef than the SecState because it deals with programs and material in the DoD. Second, do you really think Zelenskyy and S4 think that the AFU can take back Crimea? Or do you think they know it is lost but they have to keep saying it to maintain a negotiating position?
I lead a lot of 8-9 figure negotiations, and regardless of whether I have an expectation of getting a particular concession, I would NEVER take it off the table prior to negotiations. Regardless of likelihood it is a bargaining chip. Dismissing it ahead of time is such a poor negotiating strategy I can’t fathom what would prompt him to make that statement unless he’s already decided he’s wiling to concede a significant portion of Ukrainian soil.
Would you take it off the table if it was the only way to get the other party to the table and you really needed (in your mind) the other party to come to the table? And, yes, I believe that a serious concession of Ukrainian land already lost is already understood to be a likely result of any negotiations at this stage. The security guarantee is the critical point that we cannot concede. Ukraine won't come to an agreement without that, and they will fight on with or without us.
It's not even these people's MO either. These are people that say preposterous things like annexing Canada or building condos in Gaza. They didnt go with Donbas will be controlled by America here. Its interesting they are falling back on realpolitik here and you know, an actual reflection of the limits of American power. I guess either way certain people will bark like seals and say "negotiation geniuses."
True. And what happens to all of that equipment in the event of conflict termination? That is also a point of interest for Russia and a point of leverage for us.
Some will, to be sure. Some will also call it a failure no matter what, too. Personally, I think we need to see the deal before judging it, and we are still a long, long way from seeing a deal. We don't even have an agreement to talk yet.
Its just notable to me because its the most "realistic" stance on anything they have taken so far, unlike other outlandish things which are portrayed as negotiating tactics to get people to talk. Anyway it sort of deals a blow to the whole "madman" strategy people like to credit them for.
No idea. We don't get to see enough of the dialogue to understand what is actually happening. We are all guessing until the history is published years from now.
What about Ukraine’s reconstruction? Russia’s invasion has flatted cities and damaged infrastructure. before the war, Ukraine had one of the lowest GDPs per capita in Europe. Rebuilding will require hundreds of billions of dollars just to restore basic function. Should Russia’s frozen assets be used to fund reconstruction? Will Russia be held accountable in any way?
All great points for negotiations, though, if you're asking me, I don't think reparations would happen with any talks that successfully concluded in the next 100 days. Once again, Russia has not bled enough yet to consider it. In terms of accountability, then also not in the next 100 days, unless you consider all of the damage done to Russia thus far as accountability enough (and I don't). The absolute best outcome from any negotiations in the next 100 days is going to be an end to the war (with Russia keeping at least some of its gains) and Ukraine receiving a security guarantee that strongly mitigates the risk of war reigniting in the next few years. If you want more than that (and I do), then the answer is the war must go on, and the U.S. must become more involved. For the outcome that Russia deserves, we have to push the matter to high risk of Russian political collapse. And while Russia deserves it, the strategic second and third-order effects might be so bad that we have to ask whether the U.S. deserves it. Circling back to your question, the West will end up paying for Ukraine's reconstruction, one way or another.
have they invested any more in Crimea than they destroyed in Ukraine? if they don't want to pay to rebuild what they destroyed they give up what they built..
I think you are confusing what is just and what is realistic. We live in an anarchical world in which there is no real power above the state. There is no judge above Russia with the authority to decide what is fair and what isn't. One method available to us to appeal to Russia's interest in negotiations, but then are they are only going to do what they see fit in accordance with their own cost-benefit analysis. And from Russia's perspective, continuing the war is less risky than the dishonor of giving up Crimea or paying reparations. The other method is to appeal to Russia's fear and impose our will on them through economic and/or military force. I am certainly willing to do the second method, but I get the sense that the popular support is not there yet. Maybe after people see Russia for what it is following these negotiations that popular support goes up. We will see.
Sometimes we do what’s called bracketed negotiations where you don’t really commit to a position but provide a range in which an acceptable outcome may be achieved. This has the benefit of not making an asymmetrical concession like Hegseth just did. To me that is malfeasance for any negotiator.
