In 1948, following the Berlin Blockade but before the Korean War, the Truman Administration was faced with a similar problem we see today: Russia and China had come out as clear adversaries with intentions that ran counter to Western interests. Further, the West itself was war weary and did not really want to deal with any potential Soviet or Chinese aggression. The Administration proposed four possible strategies to the President: 1. Do nothing; 2. Withdraw to the Western Hemisphere and leave Europe and Asia to their fates; 3. Draw a line around Western interests and defend them; or 4. Preemptive attack on the Soviet Union (presumably while the U.S. still held a nuclear monopoly). The Administration ostensibly ruled out 1, 2, and 4 (but essentially did #1 at first, because it could not get Congress to agree to build up the armed forces), and this is where the policy known today as Containment came from. The problem, as we know now, was that U.S. forces were insufficient to enforce Containment, and in fact military budget cuts continued all the way up until the outbreak of war in Korea, which changed the game. Given our current problem set, which strategy would you advise? I have updated the choices for the current situation from least to most aggressive. No strategy below is comprehensive. Please vote on which one is most aligned with your thinking, then in your comments state what you would add to or subtract from what I wrote. Withdrawal. Effectively moving our redlines back toward the U.S., well outside of any conflict with Russia and/or China, in order to reduce desired ends, bringing them in alignment with current and future means. In Europe, this would mean reaffirming agreements made with the former Soviet Union at Tehran, Yalta, and Potsdam (with the exception of agreements related to East Germany and Berlin), declaring that Eastern Europe is exclusively within Russia’s sphere of influence. This means renegotiating the North Atlantic Treaty so that all countries who have joined since 1991 (again, except reunified Germany) fall outside of Article V. All NATO missions and troop presences in Eastern Europe and the Balkans come to an end. The U.S. can help organize an alliance of all former NATO members and sell them weapons, but there is no guarantee of U.S. protection in the event of Russian aggression unless it manifests against Turkey, Greece, Norway, Germany, or any of the other pre-1991 NATO members. In Asia, the U.S. formally abrogates the Taiwan Relations Act and recognizes Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan and the whole South China Sea up to the territorial waters of the Philippines, Vietnam, etc. The positives of this strategy include that it probably pushes armed conflict with Russia and China at least a generation to the right; it allows the in-progress military cuts to continue without additional risk; it reduces Russian and Chinese incentives to interfere in our economy and elections. The negatives are that Ukraine, Moldova, the Baltics, and perhaps more of Eastern Europe will probably fall under Russian conquest one way or another, the same for Taiwan under China, and China will control unopposed a huge sea line of communication between Singapore and Japan; we probably irreparably damage relations with present allies; Russian and Chinese gains will make them more powerful militarily, economically, and politically; and historically, appeasing aggressors has only tended to make them more aggressive, so we should expect new Chinese and/or Russian demands within 10 years of making this move. Status Quo. This is a more tactful way of saying, “doing nothing” as the Truman Administration understood it. This course of action maintains the current ends-means mismatch. We continue material support of Ukraine and other countries that come under attack but continue our own military cuts while not reducing any missions worldwide. The main positive is that it does not require any changes in policy. The main negative is that risk of general war steadily increases while our ability to effect a positive outcome in the event of general war steadily decreases. Effectively, we “hope” that everything works out on the current path. Containment. Addresses the ends-means mismatch by bringing up means consistent with desired ends. We formally declare our redlines, without respect to where Russia or China declare theirs, and then fortify them. This includes such actions as renegotiating the North Atlantic Treaty so that there are no more “goals,” only commitments. Any member state can leave immediately with no hard feelings, but continued membership means having a military manned, trained, and equipped consistent with GDP, and all member nations without a land or sea border with Russia or Belarus (U.S., U.K., France, Spain et al) must maintain an agreed percentage of forward deployed forces in the territory of a NATO border state (Poland, Baltics, Finland et al). This alliance may or may not include Ukraine (or more likely a Ukrainian rump state), Moldova, and any of the Caucasian states; it kind of depends on what happens over the next year. All Tehran, Yalta, and Potsdam understandings are null and void; Russia’s territorial gains since 1945 are no longer guaranteed. In Asia, the U.S. sponsors an alliance built on the foundations of NATO (bonus points for a cool name) with at least Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Philippines, Vietnam, and Australia as members. Consistent with the same principle as Europe, member nations build fortifications and station troops in border nations, Taiwan especially. The positive is that this method best deters further Russian and Chinese overt aggression and, ironically, gives the best chance for avoiding general war indefinitely. Negatives are that it would be expensive (probably including a U.S. peacetime military on the order of the Reagan Administration), meaning higher taxes (which Republicans won’t like) combined with reduced social spending (which Democrats won’t like). It will involve taking strong, unpopular measures to protect our elections and economy. Solving the energy problems this method causes would also take mitigation measures that both sides would loathe for different reasons. This course of action takes a long time to implement and must be sustained for perhaps generations. Initiative. Uses current means to expedite the defeat of Russia and deter China from ever making its move. Gradually but steadily increasing diplomatic, informational, economic, and military pressure on Russia while doing more in our power to reduce pressure on Ukraine. Avoiding direct armed conflict but not cowering from it either. The idea here is that China becomes convinced that any move against Taiwan presents an unacceptable risk of U.S. interference and postpones it for another generation. Not necessarily in this order and certainly not comprehensive, but these are examples of U.S. actions to increase involvement while managing risk: Taking responsibility for all Ukrainian combat casualties: transporting them out of Ukraine, treating them in NATO field hospitals, and returning them to duty if possible; Ukraine maintains sole responsibility to treat Russian prisoners of war Establishing a neutral sea lane between Odessa and Istanbul and enforcing a maritime exclusion zone with warships and submarines, the purpose of which is to allow Ukraine fair access to its sea trade and keep the grain flowing out. Moving a SAM umbrella up to the NATO-Ukrainian border and shooting down any Russian cruise missiles that penetrate its max effective range, ostensibly protecting our depots and casualty-exchange points but actually protecting Lviv, Odessa, and other border population centers Establishing a military assistance command with advisors at the general staff and operational command (corps, division) levels but not down to the tactical level (brigade and below) Taking charge with NATO logistical troops of the Ukrainian supply chain from NATO depots to corps and division depots outside of 10 miles from the front; all deliveries within 10 miles of the front must be done by Ukrainian forces, but we at least are able to confirm that most of the supplies are roughly going where they are most needed A no-fly zone patrolled by NATO aircraft over Ukrainian territory east of 10 miles from the front (to necessarily protect our logistical troops and advisors) The positives are that this is the best means for Ukraine to achieve status quo antebellum (2014) without NATO intentionally and directly engaging Russian troops; this can be done quickly and with resources currently on hand; and presents the best opportunity to emasculate and cause the downfall of Putin’s regime. The clear negative is that it also presents the greatest risk of escalating into general war.
I feel like our goal should be to draw out the Ukrainian war as long and as expensively for Russia as possible without drawing the US into combat. Russia’s economics is its weakness. That’s basically #2 with more money flowing into Ukraine than currently is going. I’d directly sell weapons. I might give up something China wants to pull them away from Russian markets. Only reason to pause on that is Russians show a knack for suffering over rebellion making the economic assault only so effective. Russian Economy Contracts Sharply as War and Sanctions Take Hold
Ok, I'll give my amateur shot even though I am no military historian nor a military strategist. On the path to becoming the worlds only and greatest superpower we made lots and lots of enemies, so I would say we need to be somewhere between#3 and #4. We cannot afford to be passive and definitely not isolationist. China wants to replace us as the major military power and economy, therefore the worlds only superpower. Russia has way to small of an economy to be a superpower, but their intentions are revenge and they want to destroy us, making them more dangerous than China. Even now they have the capability to inflict enormous damage on the CONUS. The entire middle-east hates us because of our capitalistic interference with their countries for gas over the decades. So #1 and #2 are off the table for me. But we can't really do a full #4 because of our reckless spending over the last 42 years and because of our current dysfunctional partisan climate. I voted for #4 because we have way too many enemies and can't afford containment nor isolationism. We need to aggressively protect Democracy but fall short of full outright war. If that can be done, that is. Take all of that with a grain of salt.
The key is having cooperation with Europe. Too often, Europe would pay lip service to a goal, like containing Russia or China, and continue to do business with them. One positive from Trump's idiotic presidency was forcing Europe to think more about providing for their own self-defense. One negative is that Trump's arrogance prevented any kind of cooperation with Europe during his administration. Russia then did us a big favor by invading Ukraine. Europe quickly woke up to the bear on their doorstep. Fortunately for them, the bear is drunk and confused, but it's still dangerous. Europe is mostly united in supporting the defeat of Russia, and wants to become independent of the cheap energy that Russia has been supplying them. Germany's economy is taking a major hit right now, and the winter could get downright ugly. After the Ukraine situation is resolved, we'll see if Germany backslides into dependence on Russian energy. It would be great if Europe could resolve their energy needs by allowing wealthy northern countries like Germany to invest in solar power in southern places like Spain, and get electricity from a European electrical grid. I know many countries get power from their neighbors (Germany gets some electricity from nuclear plants in the Czech Republic, I believe, and sells power to Sweden), but there doesn't seem to be a complete power grid connecting all countries, or a way of allowing capital investment from one area of Europe to another. Germany should not be investing in solar power within their borders--they don't get that much sunshine. Spain should be investing more in solar power, but they aren't wealthy enough to do more. How does cross-border electricity trade work in Europe? – EU-SysFlex
Supplementing with wind, solar, tidal, and hydroelectric is fine, but there is not enough real estate to power the Western economies with it, especially if we want the overwhelming majority of privately owned vehicles to be electric. We need drop our aversion to nuclear and build our economies around it. That takes time, though. In the mean time, though, whether we like it or not, our economies run on hydrocarbons. Russia makes it in excess, and we don’t (though, we are capable of doing so). In my opinion, we have to become the main supplier of hydrocarbons to the West, to keep their lights on, while we make a deliberate transition to nuclear.
So my probably naive suggestion is that we stop treating China like an enemy and start treating them like a desired strategic partner. The US and China are the biggest trading partners in the history of the world. China needs us to keep their economy rolling. We need them so we can buy cheap shit. China has little in common with Russia (communism I guess, but neither are true forms of communism as far as I can tell) and shares a long long border with them. It would seem China has more to fear about an aggressively expanding Russia than we do. Like I said, I don't have a deep understanding of China and their intent. But it seems the more we push them away the more we are pushing them towards Russia. A Russia/China partnership is something that would truly scare me in a WWIII scenario.
The U.S. was trying to avoid conflict prior to WWII. We allowed Japan to take over Korea, Taiwan and parts of China prior to 1940 (we gave Japan the idea for taking over Korea, BTW). The U.S. opposed giving Japan access to oil from places like Malaysia, and that was a big reason for Pearl Harbor. We also stopped buying silk from Japan prior to WWII because we started manufacturing nylon, and that was a reason for WWII. The biggest reason was the fact that we had a naval base in the middle of the Pacific Ocean. Were any of those things legitimate instigators for Pearl Harbor? Not to us. But to the Japanese they were. Even if you aren't instigating a conflict in your way of thinking, all it takes is for someone else to decide that you are instigating a conflict. The only way to be absolutely sure that you aren't instigating a conflict is to surrender unconditionally prior to the first shot being fired. In reality, what has to be done is to manage conflict. Conflict is always going to be there, in one form or another.
Because of the shared border, as well as some history of conflict and threats from the old days, China and Russia will never completely trust each other. China so completely mistrusted Russia in the 1950's that they built weapons factories in the most remotest locations and farthest-flung places in China (even up in the mountains), so Russia could not easily invade and disable China's military. China cannot be all that scared of Russia these days after what they have seen in Ukraine. They would prefer to support Russia to the extent that Russia be the first to start fighting with the U.S. and weaken us before China finishes us off. China wants us to focus on them as a trading partner, much as Japan wanted us to focus on them as a trading partner in the 1930's. They want us to overlook their military buildup, their bullying of neighbors, their I.P. theft, their claiming of territory that does not belong to them. China's intent is fairly clear: world domination. Not necessarily in the form of taking on other countries as colonies--they don't need to do that. Their goal is to make the rules: one set of rules for China, and another for everyone else. Their military is not for self-defense, because no one is threatening China militarily. The purpose of China's military is to enforce the rules. Don't worry--they will allow you to be a second-class citizen of the world, as long as you obey their rules.
Given where we are today Option 2 is the best we can muster at the moment as options 3 and 4 will require significant buy in from the American public as well as European nations. As for option 3 what are we talking about when you state consistent with GDP? If we are talking GDP of each member we know where the bulk of the support is coming from. In all cases it would be the US supporting armies of European nations both in troops and financially to maintain a status quo in the best interests of the US. Given our current issues I don't see how this is possible. We have painted ourselves into a corner as has most of Europe in the realm of fossil fuels and availability. We are going to need to produce and refine a lot of it which we currently don't have. Putting ourselves in that position will take years to accomplish. Russia didn't do it over night. All that said I see ourselves pushing in the direction of option 1 self preservation unless some diplomatic means of drawing the war to an end is reached.
Currently, NATO members have a “goal” of defense spending at a minimum of 2% GDP. There are no consequences for not reaching one’s goal, and most members don’t even try. The most glaring example until recently was Germany, but we will see what they do now. I was saying that the “goal” now needs to a price of membership along with forward-deployment of a certain percentage of troops. Many NATO members fully enjoy the protection and benefits (access to restricted technology, etc) without any sacrifice to speak of.
I think the word you meant was escalating not instigating. The conflict has already been instigated in my opinion.
That’s fair. How about I’m not a fan of instigating any further conflict. Let’s keep the gas away from the fire.
I don't have an issue with that and I agree many European nations have been riding on the coat tails of US military support for decades on end. The question is what would be acceptable concerning percentage of GDP and what would be the consequence of not meeting it. Military expenditure as percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) in highest spending countries 2021
2% is the goal now. I think that’s a start. And the obvious consequence is, you’re not in NATO if you refuse to pay your membership dues.
Thanks for starting this thread. It’s a good one. I look forward to swinging back to this one when I actually have some time.
Some combination of 3 and 4. I just don’t think withdrawing in any way is a viable scenario, and actually creates more danger of geopolitical conflicts. As to 4 I generally like the sound of that, I am kind of let’s shit or get off the pot. At this point if we were to aggressively defend Ukraine I’m not sure Russia is in a position to really do anything about it, and it sends a message to China re Taiwan.
