Strategy for Engaging Russia-China Coalition

In 1948, following the Berlin Blockade but before the Korean War, the Truman Administration was faced with a similar problem we see today: Russia and China had come out as clear adversaries with intentions that ran counter to Western interests. Further, the West itself was war weary and did not really want to deal with any potential Soviet or Chinese aggression. The Administration proposed four possible strategies to the President: 1. Do nothing; 2. Withdraw to the Western Hemisphere and leave Europe and Asia to their fates; 3. Draw a line around Western interests and defend them; or 4. Preemptive attack on the Soviet Union (presumably while the U.S. still held a nuclear monopoly). The Administration ostensibly ruled out 1, 2, and 4 (but essentially did #1 at first, because it could not get Congress to agree to build up the armed forces), and this is where the policy known today as Containment came from. The problem, as we know now, was that U.S. forces were insufficient to enforce Containment, and in fact military budget cuts continued all the way up until the outbreak of war in Korea, which changed the game.

Given our current problem set, which strategy would you advise? I have updated the choices for the current situation from least to most aggressive. No strategy below is comprehensive. Please vote on which one is most aligned with your thinking, then in your comments state what you would add to or subtract from what I wrote.

1. Withdrawal. Effectively moving our redlines back toward the U.S., well outside of any conflict with Russia and/or China, in order to reduce desired ends, bringing them in alignment with current and future means. In Europe, this would mean reaffirming agreements made with the former Soviet Union at Tehran, Yalta, and Potsdam (with the exception of agreements related to East Germany and Berlin), declaring that Eastern Europe is exclusively within Russia’s sphere of influence. This means renegotiating the North Atlantic Treaty so that all countries who have joined since 1991 (again, except reunified Germany) fall outside of Article V. All NATO missions and troop presences in Eastern Europe and the Balkans come to an end. The U.S. can help organize an alliance of all former NATO members and sell them weapons, but there is no guarantee of U.S. protection in the event of Russian aggression unless it manifests against Turkey, Greece, Norway, Germany, or any of the other pre-1991 NATO members. In Asia, the U.S. formally abrogates the Taiwan Relations Act and recognizes Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan and the whole South China Sea up to the territorial waters of the Philippines, Vietnam, etc. The positives of this strategy include that it probably pushes armed conflict with Russia and China at least a generation to the right; it allows the in-progress military cuts to continue without additional risk; it reduces Russian and Chinese incentives to interfere in our economy and elections. The negatives are that Ukraine, Moldova, the Baltics, and perhaps more of Eastern Europe will probably fall under Russian conquest one way or another, the same for Taiwan under China, and China will control unopposed a huge sea line of communication between Singapore and Japan; we probably irreparably damage relations with present allies; Russian and Chinese gains will make them more powerful militarily, economically, and politically; and historically, appeasing aggressors has only tended to make them more aggressive, so we should expect new Chinese and/or Russian demands within 10 years of making this move.
2. Status Quo. This is a more tactful way of saying, “doing nothing” as the Truman Administration understood it. This course of action maintains the current ends-means mismatch. We continue material support of Ukraine and other countries that come under attack but continue our own military cuts while not reducing any missions worldwide. The main positive is that it does not require any changes in policy. The main negative is that risk of general war steadily increases while our ability to effect a positive outcome in the event of general war steadily decreases. Effectively, we “hope” that everything works out on the current path.
3. Containment. Addresses the ends-means mismatch by bringing up means consistent with desired ends. We formally declare our redlines, without respect to where Russia or China declare theirs, and then fortify them. This includes such actions as renegotiating the North Atlantic Treaty so that there are no more “goals,” only commitments. Any member state can leave immediately with no hard feelings, but continued membership means having a military manned, trained, and equipped consistent with GDP, and all member nations without a land or sea border with Russia or Belarus (U.S., U.K., France, Spain et al) must maintain an agreed percentage of forward deployed forces in the territory of a NATO border state (Poland, Baltics, Finland et al). This alliance may or may not include Ukraine (or more likely a Ukrainian rump state), Moldova, and any of the Caucasian states; it kind of depends on what happens over the next year. All Tehran, Yalta, and Potsdam understandings are null and void; Russia’s territorial gains since 1945 are no longer guaranteed. In Asia, the U.S. sponsors an alliance built on the foundations of NATO (bonus points for a cool name) with at least Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Philippines, Vietnam, and Australia as members. Consistent with the same principle as Europe, member nations build fortifications and station troops in border nations, Taiwan especially. The positive is that this method best deters further Russian and Chinese overt aggression and, ironically, gives the best chance for avoiding general war indefinitely. Negatives are that it would be expensive (probably including a U.S. peacetime military on the order of the Reagan Administration), meaning higher taxes (which Republicans won’t like) combined with reduced social spending (which Democrats won’t like). It will involve taking strong, unpopular measures to protect our elections and economy. Solving the energy problems this method causes would also take mitigation measures that both sides would loathe for different reasons. This course of action takes a long time to implement and must be sustained for perhaps generations.
4. Initiative. Uses current means to expedite the defeat of Russia and deter China from ever making its move. Gradually but steadily increasing diplomatic, informational, economic, and military pressure on Russia while doing more in our power to reduce pressure on Ukraine. Avoiding direct armed conflict but not cowering from it either. The idea here is that China becomes convinced that any move against Taiwan presents an unacceptable risk of U.S. interference and postpones it for another generation. Not necessarily in this order and certainly not comprehensive, but these are examples of U.S. actions to increase involvement while managing risk:

• Taking responsibility for all Ukrainian combat casualties: transporting them out of Ukraine, treating them in NATO field hospitals, and returning them to duty if possible; Ukraine maintains sole responsibility to treat Russian prisoners of war
• Establishing a neutral sea lane between Odessa and Istanbul and enforcing a maritime exclusion zone with warships and submarines, the purpose of which is to allow Ukraine fair access to its sea trade and keep the grain flowing out.
• Moving a SAM umbrella up to the NATO-Ukrainian border and shooting down any Russian cruise missiles that penetrate its max effective range, ostensibly protecting our depots and casualty-exchange points but actually protecting Lviv, Odessa, and other border population centers
• Establishing a military assistance command with advisors at the general staff and operational command (corps, division) levels but not down to the tactical level (brigade and below)
• Taking charge with NATO logistical troops of the Ukrainian supply chain from NATO depots to corps and division depots outside of 10 miles from the front; all deliveries within 10 miles of the front must be done by Ukrainian forces, but we at least are able to confirm that most of the supplies are roughly going where they are most needed
• A no-fly zone patrolled by NATO aircraft over Ukrainian territory east of 10 miles from the front (to necessarily protect our logistical troops and advisors)

The positives are that this is the best means for Ukraine to achieve status quo antebellum (2014) without NATO intentionally and directly engaging Russian troops; this can be done quickly and with resources currently on hand; and presents the best opportunity to emasculate and cause the downfall of Putin’s regime. The clear negative is that it also presents the greatest risk of escalating into general war.

 

Supplementing with wind, solar, tidal, and hydroelectric is fine, but there is not enough real estate to power the Western economies with it, especially if we want the overwhelming majority of privately owned vehicles to be electric. We need drop our aversion to nuclear and build our economies around it. That takes time, though. In the mean time, though, whether we like it or not, our economies run on hydrocarbons. Russia makes it in excess, and we don’t (though, we are capable of doing so). In my opinion, we have to become the main supplier of hydrocarbons to the West, to keep their lights on, while we make a deliberate transition to nuclear.

 

Did you mean that we can’t do a full #3? Ironically, initiative is cheaper than containment.

 

Currently, NATO members have a “goal” of defense spending at a minimum of 2% GDP. There are no consequences for not reaching one’s goal, and most members don’t even try. The most glaring example until recently was Germany, but we will see what they do now. I was saying that the “goal” now needs to a price of membership along with forward-deployment of a certain percentage of troops. Many NATO members fully enjoy the protection and benefits (access to restricted technology, etc) without any sacrifice to speak of.

 

I think the word you meant was escalating not instigating. The conflict has already been instigated in my opinion.

 

2% is the goal now. I think that’s a start. And the obvious consequence is, you’re not in NATO if you refuse to pay your membership dues.